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Religion, Zoning, and the 
Free Exercise Clause: The Impact of 
Employment Division v. Smith 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Land use and religion are two areas of the law that may 
appear to be distant and removed from each other. Occasional-
ly, however, the paths of these dissimilar areas cross, and a 
conflict emerges. The potential for conflict was heightened by 
the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Employ-
ment Division v. Smith. 2 The Smith decision is said to be "the 
most important development in the law of religious freedom in 
decades."3 
Land use and religion cross paths when a religious group 
attempts to locate its meeting or worshipping facilities in an 
area where such activities are either not allowed by local zon-
ing ordinances, or are allowed only by special or conditional use 
permit. The conflict emerges when the conditional use permit 
or zoning amendment is denied. Does this denial violate the 
First Amendment's guarantee to a free exercise of religion?4 
It is essential for most religious groups to have a reason-
ably accessible place of worship for their membership. Zoning 
laws that prohibit or restrict places of worship do inhibit, to 
some degree, the free exercise of religion. The question is whe-
ther this inhibition is permissible or whether it violates 
protections offered by the Constitution. 
There are two possible interpretations of the Free Exercise 
Clause. The first interpretation "require[s] the government, in 
the absence of a sufficiently compelling need, to grant exemp-
tions from legal duties that conflict with religious obligations."5 
1. 494 U.S. H72 (1990). 
2. !d. 
3. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Free Exercise]. 
4. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides that "Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof ... ." U.S. CoN~'T. amend I. 
5. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free 
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1411 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, 
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The second interpretation "guarantee[s] only that religious 
believers will be governed by equal laws, without discrimina-
tion or preference."6 The former view embraces the perspective 
of the believer, while the latter view reflects the perspective of 
the government. 
In land use, application of the first view would permit 
churches 7 to locate their worship facilities anywhere in a city, 
irrespective of the applicable zoning laws, unless the local gov-
ernment could show a sufficiently compelling reason to pre-
clude them. In other words, the religious group would be ex-
empt from the otherwise generally applicable laws. 
The second view would allow a municipality to prevent church-
es from locating anywhere in its borders as long as the practice 
did not discriminate or give preference to certain religions. 
The Court, in Smith, adopted the second reading of the 
Free Exercise Clause.8 Smith is not a land use case, but its 
language is broad, and may be found to have application in 
many situations. However, applying Smith's terms to land 
use/religion conflicts goes against the interpretation of the Free 
Exercise Clause envisioned by the Founding Fathers of the 
Constitution. 
II. EARLY HISTORY OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 
As noted, there are two possible readings of the Free Exer-
cise Clause, one for religious exemptions absent a compelling 
governmental interest, and the other for all equal, non-discrim-
inatory laws to apply regardless of the effect on religion. Argu-
ably, either interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause can be 
supported by the plain meaning of its terms, "Congress shall 
make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof .... "9 
Justice Brennan, commenting on the religion clauses, sug-
gested, "the line we must draw between the permissible and 
impermissible is one which accords with history and faithfully 
reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers."10 The 
Oripins]. 
6. ld. 
7. Church in this writing is meant to be synonymous with synagogue, mosque, 
shrine, temple, etc. 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 43-51'1. 
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
10. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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history of the Free Exercise Clause reveals the religious exemp-
tion issue was very important to many states. In fact, several 
states did not ratify the Constitution until they felt their con-
cerns over free religious practice were protected by the First 
Amendment. 11 
A. Pre-constitutional Free Exercise 
The Early American religious freedom movement was, in 
part, the result of a broad reaction against dominant state 
religions of several of the colonies. 12 Religious sects believed 
the establishment of state religion would provide civil authori-
ties the power to control religion. 13 This concern prompted 
twelve of the thirteen original states to write constitutions with 
provisions protecting religious freedom. 14 
The first "free exercise" clause appeared in a Maryland 
statute in 1649: "noe [sic] person ... professing to beleive [sic] 
in Jesus Christ, shall from henceforth bee [sic] any waies [sic] 
troubled ... for ... his or her religion nor in the free exercise 
thereof .... "15 Other early free exercise provisions had three 
noteworthy characteristics. First, the free exercise provisions 
expressly preempted contrary laws. 16 Second, they extended to 
all aspects of religion, not just opinion, speech, profession or 
worshipY Third, free exercise could be limited only to prevent 
injury or outward disturbances to others, "rather than by refer-
ence to all generally applicable laws."18 Most of the colonies 
and states resolved the problems of religious minorities by 
granting exemptions from generally applicable laws. 19 
B. The Federal Free Exercise Clause 
The federal free exercise clause appears to have been pat-
terned after the most expansive state models. 20 Even so, the 
history is not conclusive on the religious exemption issue.21 
11. See McConnell, Origins, supra note 5, at 1476. 
12. !d. at 1437. 
13. !d. at 1438. 
14. !d. at 1455. 
15. !d. at 1425. 
16. !d. at 1427. 
17. lei. 
1R. !d. 
19. McConnell, Free Exercise, supra note 3, at 1118. 
20. McConnell, Ori.~<ins, supra note 5, at 1460-61. 
21. McConnell, Free Exercise, supra note 3, at 1116-19. 
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There is, however, substantial evidence that "exemptions were 
seen as a constitutionally permissible means for protecting reli-
gious freedom ... [and] were within the contemplation of the 
framers and ratifiers as a possible interpretation of the free 
exercise clause .... "22 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison were key partici-
pants in drafting the free exercise clause for the constitutions 
of both Virginia and the United States. 23 Jefferson and Madi-
son did not, however, share the same definition of religious 
freedom. 
Thomas Jefferson carefully studied the writings of John 
Locke,24 a British philosopher, and incorporated Locke's ideol-
ogy into his Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, a precur-
sor to the Bill of Rights.25 Jefferson claimed religious belief 
should be free from government control, while religious conduct 
should not.26 This belief/action distinction characterizes the 
"no exemption" position for religious freedom. 
James Madison was much more sympathetic to religious 
freedom than was Jefferson.27 Madison, while running for a 
seat in the first House of Representatives, garnered his constit-
uent's support by proposing a constitutional provision for reli-
gious liberty that protected the "rights of Conscience in the 
fullest latitude."28 He professed the free exercise right should 
prevail "in every case where it does not trespass on private 
rights or the public peace."29 His view on religious freedom 
would have provided exemptions absent a compelling govern-
mental purpose. 
Madison's vision of religious liberty, more than Jefferson's, 
faithfully depicts early American understanding of the Free Ex-
22. McConnell, Origins, supra note fi, at 141fi. 
23. ld. at 1449. 
24. Locke opposed governmental interference on the exercise of religion, but he 
saw limits on religion as well. He believed in legislative supremacy in conflicts 
between civil authority and individual conscience. His understanding of religious 
freedom precluded religious exemptions. ld. at 1432-:cl:cl, 143fi. 
2fi. ld. at 1430-31. 
26. ld. at 14fil. 
27. ld. at 14fi2. 
2R. ld. at 1476-77. When George Mason proposed the term 'toleration' for the 
religious liberty clause of the Virginia Bill of Rights, Madison objected on the 
ground that the word 'toleration' implies an act of legislative grace, which in 
Locke's understanding it was. Madison proposed, and the Virginia assembly adopt-
ed, the broader phrase: 'the full and free exercise of religion.' ld. at 1433. 
29. !d. at 1464 (as quoted in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON). 
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ercise Clause.30 He incorporated this understanding into the 
First Amendment as its principal author and floor leader.31 
Therefore, "[Madison's] espousal of exemptions should carry 
more weight than Jefferson's opposition."32 
III. MODERN SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATIONS 
OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 
A. Sherbert v. Verner33 
Sherbert is "the first and leading case in the Supreme 
Court's modern free exercise jurisprudence."34 The Court, in 
Sherbert, fashioned the "compelling state interest" test for free 
exercise disputes. 35 This balancing test requires a state to jus-
tify any burden it imposes on religion with a compelling inter-
est. 
In Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist was discharged by 
her employer for refusing to work on Saturday, the Sabbath 
Day of her faith. 36 She was subsequently denied state unem-
ployment compensation for refusing to accept employment 
which would require her to work on Saturday.37 The Court 
found the disqualification of benefits imposed a burden on her 
free exercise of religion. 38 The burden was that she was forced 
to "choose between following the precepts of her religion and 
forfeiting benefits, on one hand, and abandoning one of the 
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other 
hand."39 This "substantial infringement of [a] First Amend-
ment right" was unacceptable, according to the Court, unless 
30. ld. at 1455. 
:n. McConnell, Free Exercise, supra note 3, at 1119. 
32. ld. at 1119. 
33. 374 U.S. 39R (1963). 
34. McConnell, Origins, supra note 5, at 1412. 
35. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 43R 
(1963)). 
[The Supreme Court] over the years painstakingly has developed a con-
sistent and exacting standard to test the constitutionality of a state stat-
ute that burdens the free exercise of religion. Such a statute may stand 
only if the law in general, and the State's refusal to allow a religious 
exemption in particular, are justified by a compelling interest that cannot 
he served by less restrictive means. 
Smith, 494 U.S. at 907 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
36. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 899. 
:n ld. at 401. 
8R. ld. at 403. 
::J9. ld. at 404. 
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the government could justify its actions with a compelling state 
interest. 40 
The state's interest was limited to the "possibility that the 
filing of fraudulent claims by unscrupulous claimants feigning 
religious objections to Saturday work might not only dilute the 
unemployment compensation fund but also hinder the schedul-
ing by employers of necessary Saturday work."41 This limited 
interest would have survived the rational basis scrutiny used 
on decisions prior to Sherbert. But it did not justify the infring-
ement of an individual's right to freely exercise religion under 
the compelling state interest test fashioned by the Sherbert 
Court. 4:; 
The compelling state interest test allows for exemptions. 
The appellant in Sherbert was exempted from a law with gen-
eral applicability because of her religious beliefs. This exemp-
tion approach coincides with that espoused by James Madison 
and his supporters when enacting the Bill of Rights. 
B. Employment Division v. Smith43 
Smith is the most recent significant Supreme Court Free 
Exercise decision. The Smith Court set aside the compelling 
state interest test in favor of one that does not allow exemp-
tions from neutral laws of general applicability that prohibit 
conduct a state is free to regulate.44 
In Smith, two employees of a private drug rehabilitation 
organization were fired because they ingested peyote in a sac-
ramental ceremony at the Native American Church.45 Their 
subsequent application for unemployment compensation was 
denied because their termination was based on work related 
misconduct.46 The Supreme Court considered whether the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment permits a state 
to deny unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their 
jobs because of religiously inspired use of a controlled sub-
stance.47 
The respondents based their claim for relief on the Court's 
40. !d. at 406. 
41. !d. at 407. 
42. !d. at 409. 
4::!. 494 U.S. R72 (1990). 
44. !d. at R79. 
4fi. !d. at R74. 
46. !d. 
47. ld. 
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decision in Sherbert, where the Court held that a state could 
not condition the availability of unemployment insurance on an 
individual's willingness to forgo conduct required by his reli-
gion.48 
The Court stated the exercise of religion includes both 
belief and physical acts, and it would violate the Constitution 
for a state to "ban such acts only when they are engaged in for 
religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that 
they display."49 However, a religiously motivated act which 
violates a criminal law not specifically directed at a religious 
practice, cannot be held to be protected by the Constitution.50 
The Court stated "the right of free exercise does not relieve 
an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neu-
tral law of general applicability on the ground that the law 
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes 
(or proscribes).""1 Additionally, the Court determined the Sher-
bert balancing test should not apply to generally applicable 
criminal laws.52 Thus, generally applicable, religion-neutral 
laws that have the effect of burdening a particular religious 
practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental 
interest. 53 
The Court suggested that many laws would not meet the 
"compelling state interest" test and any society that adopts a 
system which allows exemptions absent a compelling interest 
would be "courting anarchy."54 This type of rule "would open 
the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions 
from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind .... "55 
The closing comments in the majority opinion in Smith 
suggest the respondent's only solution to obtaining an exemp-
tion for their religious practice is the political process.56 In 
fact, "a number of States have made an exception to their drug 
laws for sacramental peyote use."57 The Court explained that 
4R. !d. at H76. 
49. !d. at R77. 
fiO. !d. at R78. 
fil. !d. at H79, (quoting United States v. Lee, 4fifi U.S. 2fi2, 263 n.3 (19R2) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)). 
fi2. !d. at RR4. 
fi3. !d. at RR6 n.3. 
fi4. !d. at RRR. 
fifi. !d. 
56. !d. at R90. 
57. !d.; see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3402(B)(1)-(3) (1992); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 12-22-317(3) (1992); IDAHO CODE § 37-2732A (1992); IOWA CODE § 
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fashioning a religious practice exemption from generally appli-
cable laws is not the province of the Court, but should be rel-
egated to the political process in the legislative branch.58 
C. Smith is Not What the Framers Intended 
History shows "exemptions were consonant with the popu-
lar American understanding of the interrelation between the 
claims of a limited government and a sovereign God."59 This 
leads one to believe the modern Supreme Court would approve 
of exemptions from some generally applicable laws. Smith, 
however, is a no exemption decision. 
The majority in Smith did not consider the history of the 
Free Exercise Clause. It was mentioned only in Justice O'Conn-
or's concurring opinion where she recognized that the compel-
ling interest test of Sherbert supports the goal of the Bill of 
Rights as envisioned by the Founding Fathers. 60 The majority, 
however, appears to have followed the writings of Jefferson and 
Locke, the same teachings rejected by those who ratified the 
Constitution. ''While the historical evidence may not be un-
equivocal, ... it does, on the balance, support Sherbert's inter-
pretation of the free exercise clause."61 
IV. Smith RAMIFICATIONS ON LAND USE 
A. Analysis of Modern Pre-Smith Land Use Decisions 
Prior to Smith, courts applied the Sherbert compelling 
state interest test in one form or another to land use/religion 
decisions.62 A good example is the Fifth Circuit's decision in 
204.204(R) (1991); K.AN. STAT. ANN. 65-4116(R) (1991); MINN. STAT. § 152.02(4) 
(1992); NEV. REV. STAT. § 45::1.541 (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § ::J0-31-6(D) (Michie 
1992); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 4Rl.ll1(a) (West 1993); Wise. STAT. § 
161.115 (1990); WYO. STAT. § 35-7-1044 (1992). 
fiR. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
59. McConnell, Origins, supra note 5, at 1415. 
60. Smith, 494 U.S. at 903. 
61. McConnell, Oripins, supra note 5, at 1415. 
62. See Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, R96 F.2d 1221 
(9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 559 (1990); Islamic Ctr. of Miss., Inc. v. 
City of Starkville, R40 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 198R); Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 
F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. R27 (1984); Lakewood, Ohio Con-
gregation of Jehovah Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 
198:'l), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints v. Jefferson County, 741 F. Supp. 1522 (N.D. Ala. 1990); Church of Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla. 1989), cert 
granted, 112 S.Ct. 1472 (1992); Congregation Beth Yitzchok of Rockland, Inc. v. 
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Islamic Center of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Starkville. 63 
In Islamic Center, the city prohibited the use of buildings 
as churches in all areas near the Mississippi State University 
campus, unless an exception was granted by the city.64 It was 
important for the Islamic Center to locate its facilities near the 
campus as many of its members were students who found it 
difficult to obtain transportation to distant areas.65 The city 
would not grant an exception to the Islamic Center because 
neighbors objected to the proposal.66 To determine whether 
the denial was constitutional, the court balanced the city's 
interest in denying the exception against the burden the law 
imposed on the free exercise of religion.67 The court further 
required the city to justify the ordinance by showing a compel-
ling government interest.68 
To determine whether the government's interest was suffi-
cient, the Islamic Center court relied on Grosz v. City of Miami 
Beach,69 a decision by the Eleventh Circuit where a similar 
issue was decided. 
In Grosz, the city sought to enforce an ordinance that pro-
hibited churches, synagogues, and similar religious congrega-
tions in single-family residential zones. 70 Grosz desired to hold 
religious services in a converted detached garage adjacent to 
his home in a single-family residential district. 71 The court 
determined Grosz could conduct his activities in many other 
areas of the city zoned for religious use, some of which were 
only four blocks away, or he could make his home elsewhere in 
the city where the zoning laws allowed his conduct. 72 Al-
though this burdened Grosz in terms of convenience, dollars, or 
aesthetics, the court found the burden was relatively light. 73 
Allowing Grosz to continue with his activities, however, would 
Town of Ramapo, fi93 F. Supp. 65fi (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
6:-1. R40 F.2d 293 (fith Cir. 19R8). 
64. !d. at 294. 
6fi. !d. at 29fi. 
66. !d. at 302. Nine other Christian churches had previously applied for the 
exception and obtained it. This was the first time the exception was denied. !d. at 
297. 
67. !d. at 299. 
68. !d. 
69. 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984). 
70. !d. at n2. 
71. !d. at 7:-ll. 
72. !d. at 7:-l9. 
n. Id. 
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substantially infringe on the government's zoning policies. 74 
The city asserted an interest in enforcing the ordinance to 
avoid spot zoning, to preserve a coherent land use plan, and to 
preserve the residential quality of the single-family residential 
zones by protecting the residents from traffic, noise, and litter 
problems. 75 In short, the burden on the government out-
weighed the burden on Grosz's free exercise interest.76 
Applying the Grosz court analysis, the court in Islamic 
Center determined, "zoning ordinances ... do not violate the 
First Amendment where such ordinances place only an 'inci-
dental economic burden' on religious freedom and where alter-
native channels and opportunities are left open for religious 
conduct."77 The Islamic Center court found, 
[t)he burden placed on relatively impecunious Muslim stu-
dents by the Starkville ordinance is more than incidental, and 
the ordinance leaves no practical alternatives for establishing 
a mosque in the city limits. There is no other place in the 
City within reasonable distance from the campus where the 
students may establish a place for worship .... 78 
The Islamic Center court overruled the government's deci-
sion not to allow the exception because the burden on religious 
worship was great, with little evidence to support the govern-
ment's interest in prohibitory zoning practices. 79 
B. Smith Would Not Have Affected Previous Religion I Land 
Use Decisions 
As discussed, pre-Smith religion/land use cases have gener-
ally been decided with the Sherbert compelling state interest 
test. Would the Smith decision command a different result in 
Grosz, Islamic Center, and other cases? 
1. Generally applicable zoning laws are subject to Smith 
Grosz was a case decided in favor of the government. The 
74. ld. 
7fi. ld. at 7:3R. 
76. ld. at 741. 
77. Islamic Cpnter, 840 F.2d at .302 (citing ZIEnLER, LoCAL LAND CONTROL OF 
REUmOUS USES AND SYMBOLS, l9Rfi ZoNINn AND PLANNIN<; LAW HANDBOOK, :144 
(J. Gailey ed. 1985). 
78. ld. 
79. Id. at ao:-J. 
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outcome would be no different under a Smith analysis. Smith 
held that an individual's religious beliefs do not excuse that 
person from compliance with an otherwise valid and neutral 
law of general applicability that prohibits conduct the State is 
free to regulate.R0 The zoning ordinance at issue in Grosz fits 
this description. The government was not refusing to grant an 
exception to the church, rather, it was enforcing an existing 
zoning law with general application to any resident of the city. 
The ordinance would likely stand under Smith. 
This analysis illustrates an important point. Zoning regula-
tions that prohibit churches outright will likely be constitu-
tional under Smith regardless of their burden on religion. Gen-
eral zoning prohibitions, as a general rule, do not discriminate. 
Smith affords no special protections to religious worship in this 
case. Allowing religious use in a zone via a conditional use or a 
special use permit, however, subjects the government to a dis-
criminating role. It must consider applications for exception 
based on the merits of each case. This discretionary act remov-
es the case from the reaches of the Smith analysis and places it 
into the hands of the Sherbert compelling state interest test. 
This is important for cities that zone for religious use only by 
exception, not by right. Some of the following cases illustrate 
this point. 
2. Special use and conditional use permits avoid the Smith 
test 
The Washington Supreme Court considered the constitu-
tionality of a landmark preservation ordinance that prohibited 
the church from altering the exterior of its building in First 
Covenant Church v. City of Seattle.81 In an earlier opinion82 
of this case, the court applied the Sherbert compelling interest 
test and found in favor of the church. On appeal, the United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judg-
ment, and remanded to the Washington Supreme Court "for 
RO. See supra text accompanying notes 4::1-iiR. 
Rl. R40 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992). The issues surrounding landmark and historic 
preservation ordinances are distinct from hut closely related to zoning ordinances. 
First Covenant is included in this discussion because it supports the proposition 
that Smith will not apply to ordinances that require individualized exceptions. 
R2. First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1::!fi2 (Wash. 1990), cert. 
granted, judpment vacated and remanded, 111 S.Ct. 1097 (1991). 
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further consideration in light of [Smith ]."xa 
On remand, the court distinguished First Covenant from 
Smith. The landmark ordinance at issue in First Covenant did 
not apply to all churches, it only applied to those which met 
certain criteria and were designated by the Landmark's Preser-
vation Board. 84 The court determined the landmark ordinanc-
es were not generally applicable laws "because they invite indi-
vidualized assessments of the subject property and the owner's 
use of such property, and contain mechanisms for individual-
ized exceptions."85 Since the Smith test only applies to gener-
ally applicable laws, the court again applied the compelling 
interest test to this case, finding in favor of the church. 86 
This same analysis should apply to zoning regulations. 
Zoning laws that absolutely prohibit churches are valid in light 
of Smith. Zoning laws that allow religious use by special use or 
conditior.al use permits are subject to the scrutiny of the Sher-
bert compelling interest test. 
For example, consider Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City 
of San Francisco,87 where a church was holding services in a 
rented hotel room and wished to move into a house in a res-
idential district. Churches were required to obtain a special use 
permit to locate in the residential district. The city's denial of 
the permit was upheld by the Ninth Circuit. That court found 
the city had a compelling interest in "the maintenance of the 
integrity of its zoning scheme and the protection of its residen-
tial neighborhoods."88 The church's interest was to find a more 
convenient and less expensive place of worship.89 The court 
found the burden on the church of finding another suitable 
location was minimal compared to the government's interest in 
denying the permit. 90 
Christian Gospel Church is not subject to the Smith test 
since it involves a special use permit. Rather, the Sherbert 
compelling interest test applies and the outcome of Christian 
Gospel Church does not change. 
R3. First Covenant, 840 P.2d at 17R (citing First Covenant 111 S.Ct. 1097 
(1991)). 
84. ld. at 177-78, 180. 
85. ld. at 181. 
86. !d. at 182, 18R-89. 
87. 896 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 559 (1990). 
RR. ld. at 1224. 
89. !d. 
90. !d. at 1225. 
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Similarly, Islamic Center involved an ordinance that was 
not general in its application. The only way for a religious 
group to obtain a place of worship was to apply for an excep-
tion to the existing zoning regulations. Granting or denying an 
exception absent well-defined criteria places the government in 
a discriminating role. 91 The Smith holding does not apply to 
discriminatory laws. Therefore the outcome in Islamic Center 
would not change. 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Jefferson 
Countyn is a more difficult case. The church in this case at-
tempted to receive permission to locate its facilities in a resi-
dential district.93 New churches were not allowed in any zone 
by right or by exception.94 The only way for a church to move 
into any area in the county was to apply for rezoning.95 The 
county denied the rezoning application primarily because the 
surrounding community objected.96 
The court, applying the compelling interest test, found in 
favor of the church. The government's interest in requiring 
rezoning applications for all religious uses was to have "site 
development control over institutional construction."97 The 
burden on religion was that rezonings were "dependent not 
upon objective standards but upon the neighborhood's willing-
ness to accept a church."98 This zoning scheme burdened 
churches to the point it was held to violate the church's First 
Amendment rights. 99 
At first glance, it may appear the Smith test should apply 
to this case. There were no exceptions for the government to 
consider. The zoning laws precluded all churches from entering 
the county absent a rezone. This appears to be a generally 
applicable law. The Jefferson County court, however, found the 
zoning system to be "what is tantamount to a special permit 
91. An ordinance requiring a special use permit or exception for the religious 
use of a property should contain specific, religiously neutral standards to reduce 
the likelihood of discriminating acts by a government. Laurie Reynolds, Zoning the 
Church: The Police Power Versus the First Amendment, 64 B.U.L. REV. 767, 769, 
7R9 (1985). 
92. 741 F. Supp. 1522 (N.D. Ala. 1990). 
93. ld. at 1fi23. 
94. Id. at 1fi26. 
95. ld. 
96. ld. at 1523-24. 
97. ld. at :!.526. 
98. ld. at 1534. 
99. ld. at 153fi. 
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system."100 Permitting religious use on the basis of rezoning 
application is equivalent to permitting such uses on the basis of 
special use and conditional use permits. The only way for a 
government to avoid the strict scrutiny of Sherbert in this situ-
ation is to establish zones where churches can locate as of 
right. 
C. Religions Should Not be Subject to the Political Process in 
the Land Use Context 
The closing comments of the majority opinion in Smith are 
disturbing to anyone who belongs to a minority religious group. 
The Court determined it should not fashion any religious ex-
emptions under the Bill of Rights, but exemptions should be 
the result of the political process. 101 
Justice O'Connor disagreed with the majority, stating, "the 
First Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the rights of 
those whose religious practices are not shared by the majority 
and may be viewed with hostility."102 It is these groups whose 
rights deserve judicial protection under the Constitution, other-
wise the majoritarian rule will overpower minority religions. 
Justice O'Connor quoted from Justice Jackson to make her 
point: 
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain 
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place 
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to es-
tablish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. 
One's right to life, .liberty, and property, to free speech, a free 
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamen-
tal rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the 
outcome of no elections. 103 
Arguably, the political process is insufficient to protect any 
aspect of religious freedom. Likewise the political process does 
little to protect religious freedom in the land use context. 
In land use, a zoning amendment proposal is presented to 
several governmental bodies at different times before the a-
100. !d. at 1534. 
101. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
102. !d. at 902 (O'Connor J., concurring in judgment). 
lO::l. !d. at 908 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting West Virginia 
State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 819 U.S. at 6::l8 (overruling Minersville School Dist. 
v. Gobitis, :no u.s. fi86 (1940)). 
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mendment is approved. Each stage of the approval process is 
subject to public scrutiny and those of the public who are op-
posed may openly voice their opinion. The government officials 
in position to determine whether the zoning amendment passes 
or fails are either elected or appointed and feel like they should 
represent their constituent's desires. This is one way zoning 
decisions are subject to the political process. Churches are often 
denied access to certain areas because of public opposition. 
Jefferson and Islamic Center are cases where neighborhood 
opposition induced the government officials to deny the church-
es' requested zoning amendments. The churches in these two 
cases relied on the judiciary to protect their religious freedom 
since the political process failed to do so. If this is the same 
political process the Court was referring to in Smith, minority 
churches no longer have unique protections under the Bill of 
Rights. 
D. Churches Cannot Be Prohibited From a Municipality 
In Grosz, the court held a general law can prohibit a per-
son from locating religious facilities in certain zones. Does 
Smith extend the law to the point that a city government may 
entirely exclude religious uses from its boundaries with gener-
ally applicable zoning ordinances? At first glance, the Smith 
test appears to do just that. 
Prior to Smith, the majority rule was that churches may 
not be excluded from residential areas. 104 However, most of 
these decisions were based on due process, not the Free Exer-
cise Clause. 105 
California courts have departed from the majority rule and 
have concluded the exclusion of churches from residential dis-
tricts is reasonable and does not violate due process. 106 
The Supreme Court has held "the availability of other sites 
outside city limits does not permit a city to forbid the exercise 
of a constitutionally protected right within its limits."107 The 
Fifth Circuit has stated this rule applies to the religion clauses 
104. See Scott David Godshall, Land Use Repulation and the Free Exercise 
ClausP, R4 CoLUM. L. REV. 1562, at 1569 n.42 (1984) (citing cases). 
105. !d. 
106. See Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 805 
(1949). 
107. Islamic Center, 840 F.2d at 300 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Schad v. Borough 
of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981)). 
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in a zoning case. 108 
The majority in Smith stated, 
the 'exercise of religion' often involves ... assembling with 
others for a worship service ... [and i]t would be true, we 
think (though no case of ours has involved the point), that a 
State would be 'prohibiting the free exercise of religion' if it 
sought to ban such acts ... only when they are engaged in for 
religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that 
they display. 109 
Accordingly, any state or local government would find it 
difficult to prohibit churches or religious groups from its geo-
graphic confines, as this would result in the banning of reli-
gious acts. 
E. Land Use I Religion Cases Are Hybrid Claims and Not Sub-
ject to Smith 
The previous material suggests Smith's impact on religion/-
land use cases will not be as far reaching as one may have 
thought. Many of these cases fall into exceptions to Smith. The 
Smith Court opened the door to one more exception when it 
discussed "hybrid" claims. 110 The Court stated, 
[tJhe only decisions in which we have held that the First 
Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally appli-
cable law to religiously motivated action have involved not 
the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause 
in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as 
freedom of speech and of the press. 111 
The court of appeals in Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of 
Hastings 112 considered such a "hybrid" claim. Cornerstone in-
volved an ordinance that prohibited churches in the city's com-
mercial and industrial zones. 113 The church claimed this vio-
lated its rights to free speech and free exercise of religion. 114 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
lOR. ld. at 800; see also, Lakewood, Ohio, Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. 
City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 308, 807 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. Rlfi (1988). 
109. Smith, 494 U.S. at R77-7R. 
110. ld. at RRl. 
111. ld. 
112. 94R F.2d 464 (Rth Cir. 1991). 
118. ld. at 467. 
114. Id. 
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city because, among other reasons, the ordinance was valid 
under the Smith test as a neutral law of general applicabil-
ity. 115 The court of appeals reversed the grant of summary 
judgment because the district court failed to give credence to 
the Smith hybrid rights claim of the church. 116 
In Cornerstone, churches were allowed in residential areas, 
but not in the central business district. The city's stated objec-
tive was to allow uses that generate economic activity. 117 But 
the court found, regardless of the city's objective, it was the 
religious content of the applicant's speech that precluded it 
from the zone. 118 This restriction on free speech, joined to-
gether with the free exercise claim, was sufficient for the court 
of appeals to reverse the grant of summary judgment based on 
a Smith hybrid claim. 
The court in First Covenant found a hybrid claim in the 
church's challenge to the landmark preservation ordinance. 119 
The ordinance prohibited the church from altering the exterior 
of the building without approval from the Landmark's Preser-
vation Board. 120 The court determined the architecture of a 
building conveys religious beliefs. 121 Therefore, architectural 
expression of religion is a form of speech protected by the First 
Amendment. 122 "[T]he regulation of the church's exterior 
impermissibly infringes on the religious organization's right to 
free exercise and free speech."123 Since First Covenant quali-
fied as a hybrid claim, the court applied the Sherbert compel-
ling interest test instead of the Smith test. 124 
Many restrictions on churches have freedom of speech 
implications, whether it be restrictions on the church's location 
or on its architectural form. Accordingly, churches should make 
hybrid claims for all land use/religion conflicts. A successful 
claim will avoid Smith's restrictive construction. 
115. ld. at 472. 
116. ld. at 47a. 
117. ld. at 46R. 
11R. ld. 
119. R40 P.2d 174, 1R1-82 (Wash. 1992). 
120. ld. at 178. 
121. ld. at 1R2. 
122. ld. 
123. ld. (citing Crewdson, Ministry and Mortar: Historic Preservation and the 
First Amendment After Barwick, 33 J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 137, 157-58 (1988). 
124. ld. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Though the Founding Fathers did not likely consider the 
religion/land use conflict when writing the Free Exercise 
Clause, they probably would have agreed with an interpreta-
tion which allows churches to enjoy exemptions from restrictive 
zoning ordinances, rather than subject churches to all zoning 
laws regardless of their effect. This interpretation is found in 
Sherbert, not in Smith. 
Many religion/land use conflicts are the result of two par-
ties disagreeing over the application of special exceptions. 
These conflicts involve specific parties and facts and are settled 
with laws that do not have general application. Special excep-
tions, special use permits and conditional use permits remain 
subject to scrutiny under the Sherbert compelling interest test, 
not the Smith test. 
Zoning ordinances that apply generally will continue to be 
subject to Smith as there is no room for discrimination in most 
of these laws. Many of these conflicts, however, will have free-
dom of speech implications. These hybrid claims, like special 
exception claims, will be subject to Sherbert, not Smith. 
If the Court uses some of the reasoning and dicta from 
Smith to fashion a "no-exemption" argument against churches 
wishing to establish themselves in areas prohibited by local 
zoning laws, it will be going against one of the fundamental 
purposes of the Bill of Rights. That purpose is to protect the 
rights of a minority from the power of a majority. 
Land use issues decided at the local government level can 
be heavily influenced by the political majority. Religious minor-
ities cannot rely on the political process to establish a place of 
worship. If, as Smith states, the political process is the sole 
remedy for restrictions on religion, churches will essentially 
lose all rights under the Free Exercise Clause in land use is-
sues. 
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